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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
KARL OTTERSON, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No.: 20061080 - CA 
Comes now, the Defendant/Appellant, KARL OTTERSON, by and through his 
attorney of record, DANA M. FACEMYER, pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure Rule 24(c), provides this Reply to the Brief of the Appellee. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT EXCLUDED CREDIBILITY 
TESTIMONY REGARDING ONE OF THE STATES MAIN WITNESSES. 
In the Appellee's Brief, the State argues that the trial court was not in error for 
excluding the credibility testimony of Richard Cummings, one of the State's main 
witnesses, for two reasons; 1] Defendant waived his claim relating to the trial court's 
motion regarding Cummings testimony, and 2] The trial court did not abuse it's 
discretion by limiting Cummings' proposed testimony. See Aplee. Br. at 21, and 25. 
A. The Defendant's right to challenge this holding was properly preserved 
for appeal 
Appellee argues that the Defendant waived his right to challenge the trial court's 
"in limine" motion regarding Cummings proposed testimony by not calling Cummings to 
testify at trial. See Aplee. Br. at 21. Such reasoning should be rejected because 1] case 
-1 -
law cited to by the appellee refers exclusively to the testimony of the actual defendant, 
and 2] the motion regarding Cummings testimony was not made "in limine" 
a. Case law cited by the Appellee refers exclusively to the testimony of an 
actual Defendant 
The rule, that a defendant must testify at trial in order to preserve the right to 
appeal a motion limiting that defendant's testimony, refers exclusively to the testimony 
of an actual defendant. The Appellee concedes that the three primary cases used to 
establish their argument "all dealt with defendants who did not testify." See Aplee Br. at 
pg. 23 (referring to Luce, Gentry, and Kirb\>ood). As the Appellee has conceded this 
point, a more in-depth argument will not be attempted in this reply. The only source cited 
to by the Appellee to support the reasoning that this rule should apply to "a proposed 
witness who does not testify" [United States v. Coumaris, 399 F.3d 343, 348 (D.C. Cir. 
2005)] is easily distinguishable. See Aplee. Br. at 23. 
In Coumaris, the trial court granted the government's "in limine" motion to cross-
examine one of the defendant's proposed witnesses in an attempt to impeach that 
witness. Id. at 347-8. At some point during trial, counsel for the defense conceded that 
"'probably the character witnesses have already been scratched based upon' the court's 
initial [and unrelated] ruling" and the defendant himself "represented to the district court 
that he likely would not call [this] witnesses irrespective of the court's subsequent 
decision" to grant the government's "in limine" motion. This proposed witness did not 
take the stand at trial and the defense appealed the trial court's decision regarding the in 
limine motion. 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit court ruled that the defendant "waived his objection 
to the district court's in limine ruling by failing to call the character witnesses to testify." 
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Id. at 348-9. Coumaris involved a very questionable witness who didn't take the stand 
because, as defense counsel conceded, the witness himself was likely to be impeached. 
The defense also admitted that regardless of the Court's decision, it was unlikely that the 
witness would have been called to the stand anyways. Coumaris dealt with a witness and 
his likely impeachment, who didn't take the stand for that reason. It was for this reason 
that "any prejudice to [the defendant] as a result of the court's decision to allow cross-
examination on those topics is 'wholly speculative,' since [the court] 'cannot assume that 
the adverse ruling motivated [the] decision not to' call the witnesses". Id. at 349 (citing 
Luce, 469 U.S. at 41-42). 
In the case at bar, the proposed testimony of Mr. Cummings would have played a 
key role in the defendant's case by impeaching the state's key witness. In contrast to 
Coumaris, the trial court's adverse ruling directly '"motivated [the] decision not to' call 
the witnessf]." Id. at 349 (citing Luce, 469 U.S. at 41-42). Cummings' limited testimony 
as imposed by the court made his testimony practically useless and his taking the stand 
would have been a waste of time and contrary to the principles of judicial efficiency. 
Cummings' testimony would have "clearly cast doubt not only on Mr. Hill's testimony 
(the state's main witness). . . but would have created serious questions as to the bulk of 
the state's evidence." See Aplt. Br. at 14. For these reasons, Coumaris and the case at bar 
are easily and clearly distinguishable, and the State's reasoning on this subject should be 
disregarded. 
b. The motion regarding Cummings testimony was not made "in limine'* 
Even if the Court finds that this before-mentioned rule extends to proposed 
witnesses, all of the cases cited to by the appellee refer to in limine motions. Appellee 
argues that the ruling made by the trial court regarding Cummings* proposed testimony 
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should qualify as a motion in limine and therefore meets the requirements of the rule. As 
this rule refers exclusively to in limine motions and the case-at-bar does not involve such 
motions, this rule should not be applied in this case. 
A "motion in limine" is "[a] pretrial request that certain inadmissible evidence 
not be referred to or offered at trial." Black's Law Dictionary, Motion in Limine (8th ed. 
2004). Clearly an in limine motion occurs pre-trial and is in response to a request that 
certain evidence not be mentioned or used at trial. This issue was raised near the end of 
the prosecution's case, within a day of when the defense had planned to call Mr. 
Cummings to the stand. The defendant did not ask "the court to set parameters on 
Cummings' proposed testimony" as claimed by the state, but rather had Cummings 
proposed testimony limited by the judge during a break in the prosecution's case. See 
Aplee. Br. at 24. A motion in limine must be a "request" and because the state concedes 
that the "defendant raised the issue," and the defendant would never request that his own 
witness's testimony be limited, it becomes evident that this issue was not an in limine 
motion as argued by the defendant. Id. at 24. 
For these abovementioned reasons, this court should find that the ruling on this 
issue does not qualify as an in limine motion. 
B. Defendant did not waive his right to appeal the trial court's in limine 
ruling because the ruling so limited the scope of the witnesses testimony 
as to practically render his testimony useless at trial 
The appellee argues that the defense did not preserve the right to appeal the trial 
court's decision regarding Cummings testimony because Cummings was not called to the 
stand. See Aplee. Br. at 21. The Appellee reasoning follows that of Luce v. United States, 
469 U.S. 38 (1984), which is flawed (as already mentioned) as the case refers to a 
defendant who does not testify. 
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The citation to Luce that 'the court must know the precise nature of the 
defendant's testimony, which is unknowable when, as here, the defendant does not 
testify'* has been used inappropriately by the Appellee. See Aplee. Br. at 22. There is an 
obvious difference between the limiting of an actual defendant's testimony and 
speculating the prejudice and impact of that ruling at trial, and the limiting of 
Cummings' testimony in this case and judging the impact of that ruling at trial, 
especially when considering the limitation placed on Cummings testimony and that the 
record plainly states what Cummings* testimony would have been. 
The transcript clearly shows that Cummings was a "primary witness/* that the 
foundation was properly laid for Cummings* testimony, and it also outlines Cummings' 
proposed testimony. Transcript, October 4, 2006 a.m., 7-9. The court did know of the 
'"precise nature'* of the witness's testimony and so limited his testimony to render taking 
the stand practically useless. Because Cummings limited testimony was no longer useful, 
and for the sake of preserving judicial efficiency, the Defense did not call Cummings to 
the stand. See Aplnt. Br. at 10. The record shows that the Defense planned to have 
Cummings take the stand, yet due to the Court's order which rendered Cummings 
testimony '"small** and "short'* in reference to its likely impact on the jury, and time 
constraints, it was decided to not have Cummings take the stand. R. 148:14-23. 
As Cumming's testimony was allowable under U.R.E. Rule 404(b), this decision 
should be reviewed by a Utah Appellate Court uunder an abuse of discretion standard.*' 
State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 184, \ 21 (quoting State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 
59, f 16). Cummings proposed testimony was relevant as it would have gone directly to 
showing the motivations, preparations and plans of the state's primary witness, Mr. Hill, 
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"clearly cast[ing] doubt not only on Mr. Hill's testimony. . . but would have created 
serious questions as to the bulk of the state's evidence." See Aplt. Br. at 14. The court 
abused its discretion by limiting a testimony which should have been allowed by Rule 
404(b). For all these aforementioned reasons, the Appellate Court should find that the 
trial court abused it's discretion by limiting Cummings' testimony. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED IT'S DISCRETION BY EXCLUDING THE 
CONFESSION LETTER WRITTEN BY THE DEFENDANT 
In the Appellee's Brief the State argues that the trial court did not abuse it's 
discretion by excluding the confession letter for three reasons: A) uthe trial court did not 
abuse it's discretion in determining relevance, B) even if the trial court abused it's 
discretion, the error was cured by allowing reference to the letter, and C) the error was 
harmless." See Aplee. Br. at 28, 29, 30 and 31. The Appellee's argument is flawed for 
three reasons: A) the Confession Letter directly correlates with the defendant's motive, 
B) allowing reference to the letter throughout trial does not cure the error of it's 
exclusion, and C) this abuse of discretion was not harmless as the confession letter was 
relevant to both contradict the alleged motive and theory put forth by the State. 
A. The Confession Letter directly correlates with the defendant's motive 
The Appellee argues that the trial court did not error in finding the Confession 
Letter irrelevant. See Aplee. Br. at 29. Although it is true that trial courts "have wide 
discretion in determining relevance, probative value, and prejudice" [State v. Valdez, 
2006 UT App 290, f7, 141 P.3d 614] abuse of that discretion is reviewable by the 
appellate courts. Johnson, 2007 UT App 184, f21. 
That discretion is abused as soon as the trial court begins to "dictate the 
appropriate strategy for the trial attorney to pursue in a nay given situation." State v. 
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Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997). The Utah Supreme Court has established that 
counsel must have "wide latitude to make tactical decisions" and that courts should "not 
question such decisions unless [they] find 4no reasonable basis' for them." State v 
Powell 2007 UT 9,1)46 (Utah 2007) (quoting Taylor v Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 
(Utah 1995)). 
In the case-at-bar, there was a very "reasonable basis" behind the "tactical 
decision" to introduce the Confession Letter into evidence. The state's theory of the 
alleged motivation for the solicitation relied on the defendant's reaction to the way the 
prosecutor handled the defendant's previous sex abuse cases. The Confession Letter 
directly relates to this alleged motive as it portrays the defendant's desire to take 
responsibility for those previous crimes. 
The Confession Letter is extremely relevant to this case as motive is a key 
element in the charge for solicitation of murder. See UC.A § 76-4-203(1) ("An actor 
commits criminal solicitation if with intent that a felony be committed . . .") and UCA § 
76-4-203(2) ("An actor may be convicted under this section only //the solicitation is 
made under circumstances strongly corroborative of the actor's intent that the offense be 
committed.")(emphasis added.) Yet the trial court ruled that the letter "had no beaiing 
on what the jury has to decide as to the elements of the charge" R. 131:57. The trial court 
took it upon itself to make this "tactical decision," especially when considering the fact 
that the prosecution did not even object to the introduction of the letter into evidence. For 
these reasons the appellate court should find the trial court abused its discretion in not 
allowing the Confession Letter to be introduced into evidence. 
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B. Allowing reference to the letter throughout trial does not cure the error of 
it's exclusion. 
The Appellee contends that even if the court erred by excluding the confession 
letter, the error was cured by allowing reference to the letter during trial. See Aplee. Br. 
at 30. As there exists a substantial difference between knowing thait a confession letter 
exists and holding a confession letter in one's hands and being able to read it oneself, in 
no way was the error cured. 
The facts of the case cited to by the Appellee [State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ^ 29, 
994 P.2d 177] are considerably different from the case-at-bar. In Colwell, the trial court 
refused to allow a witness to answer a question which would have supported the 
defense's theory for the case. However, later during the court proceeding, the defense 
was allowed to present their theory through other means, by the combined testimony of 
others. The court explained that "[w]here evidence is excluded by the trial court and the 
substance of such evidence is later admitted through some other means, any error which 
may have resulted is cured." Id. at 183. The term "substance" in this context reveals that 
the "evidence [] later admitted through some other means" must be nearly as reliable in 
quality and quantity to the original evidence which was not previously allowed by the 
court. 
Allowing reference to the Confession Letter does not begin to come close to 
providing the same quality of evidence that presenting an actual copy of the letter to the 
jurors to hold and read would have provided. The trial court's abuse of discretion in this 
case regarding the Confession Letter could not be cured without allowing the letter to be 
introduced into evidence. The letter went directly to the defendant's motive, was 
extremely relevant and probative and the prosecution did not object to the letters 
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introduction into evidence. The trial court clearly abused its discretion and the error was 
not cured at trial. 
C. The abuse of discretion was not harmless as the confession letter was 
relevant to both contradict the alleged motive and theory put forth by the 
State. 
The Appellee argues if it is found that the trial court abused its discretion, that 
such error was harmless. See Aplee. Br. at 31. Error is harmful "[i]f it is reasonably 
likely a different outcome would result with the introduction of evidence and confidence 
in the verdict is undermined ...'" Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ^ 26. 
It is reasonably likely that there would have been a different outcome if the 
Confession Letter were allowed to be introduced into evidence. The letter clearly 
contradicted the state's theory for the defendant's motive and would have cast the 
defendant in a much better light. The defendant not only desired to take full 
responsibility for his previous crimes, but he wrote a Confession Letter which contained 
confessions for acts which he had not, and would likely never had been charged with. 
The jury deserved the right to receive such relevant information in it's entirety, and the 
defendant had the right to have such information known by those who were judging his 
guilt. 
The most influential evidence provided by the state, the testimony of Mr. Hill, 
would have been greatly rebutted by Cummings testimony if it were not for the trial 
courts abuse of discretion in that situation which significantly limited Cummings' 
testimony to the point of relatively no worth. With the introduction of both the 
Confession Letter and Cummings' proposed testimony into evidence, it is highly likely 
that there would have been a different verdict at trial. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN THE JUDGE IMPROPERLY 
TESTIFIED TO "CORRECT" THE RECORD ABOBUT A PREVIOUS 
HEARING OVER WHICH HE HAD PRESIDED 
The Appellee contends that this claim should not be reviewed under the invited 
error doctrine because the defendant "invited" the Judge to make the comments which 
are being challenged. See Aplee. Br. at 32. The Appellee does not contest the fact that the 
judge's actions were blatantly inappropriate by improperly testifying as a "witness" 
during the trial. Appellee's contention is flawed in that A) the judge made several 
inappropriate comments before the supposed "invited error" occurred, and B) the judge's 
testimony went well beyond any "invitation" from defense counsel. 
In the case-at-bar, the defendant made a few inaccurate statements while 
testifying regarding a previous court hearing which the trial court judge happened to 
preside. The trial court judge proceeded to interrupt the normal course of the trial to add 
new evidence unknown to both the defense and the prosecution. The judge in essence 
testified of personal knowledge based on recollection which directly contradicted the 
defendant's testimony. R. 131: 72-158 As stated by the prosecution, "[ajfter providing 
counsel with the file [of the previous court hearing] during a recess, Judge Stott asked 
counsel how they wished to handle the matter." See Aplee. Br. at 33. At this point, 
defense counsel agreed to have the judge reiterate his understanding of the file to the 
jury. 
The invited error doctrine reasons that when "counsel.. . affirmatively 
represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the [motion or proceeding]" 
then counsel can not appeal that motion or proceeding as he or she invited that alleged 
error. For the invited error doctrine to be applicable, it must be found that the defendant 
invited an error before any error was present. 
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A. The judge made several inappropriate comments before the supposed 
"invited error*' occurred. 
In this case, the judge interrupted the normal proceedings to share testimony 
which contradicted the testimony just rendered by the defendant. The defense did not 
invite the judge to do this. It is the prosecution's responsibility to discover such 
discrepancies during cross-examination. Judges decide questions of law; not 
discrepancies of fact. The judge was in error as soon as he interrupted the normal trial 
court proceeding to introduce new evidence into trial. The judge continued in error by 
providing the file of the previous court hearing until the time that he asked counsel how 
they wanted the matter handled. Even if it is found that the defendant invited the error of 
the judge's comments after the judge asked counsel how they wanted the matter handled, 
the court/judge had been in error for a significant amount of time beforehand. 
This court should find that the trial court erred as the judge inappropriately 
stepped away from his role as a judge at a much earlier time before the conversation 
which resulted in the alleged "invited error," The trial court should have never 
interrupted the normal proceedings to provide personal information or the file and the 
judge's question regarding the handling of the matter should have never been voiced. 
B. The judge's testimony went well beyond any "invitation" from defense 
counsel. 
This Court should find that the judge's testimony at trial was not invited because 
any "invitation'' from defense counsel did not include allowing the judge to argue that 
the defendant had lied in his previous testimony. 
At trial the judge interrupted proceedings to introduce evidence gained through 
personal experience. The judge informed counsel that according to a "responsibility of 
this court to rectify the problem, to see that the jury is not left with the testimony that's 
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been given that is incorrect," that something needed to be done about the Defendant's 
testimony. See Transcript, October 4, 2006 p.m. at 154. The judge informed counsel 
that something was going to be done, he did not ask them if something should be done, 
or provide them with the information to use as they chose, but instead he informed them 
that something would be done. 
Trial counsel does not have the freedom to critique and object to decisions of the 
court with the liberty with which they would object to the actions of opposing counsel. 
A trial judge is the ultimate authority within his or her courtroom and can only be 
corrected as to mistakes by Courts of higher authority. The legislature of this state 
recognized the practical realities of objecting to the decisions of trial judges when they 
stated that "no objection need be made in order to preserve the point." U.R E. Rule 605. 
In this case the judge had made a decision and merely gave counsel a few options 
on how to carry that decision out. Defense counsel, far from inviting the judge to testify, 
simply requested that the judge "reiterate the court's understanding of the file." See 
Transcript, October 4, 2006 p.m. at 154. 
The judge did not provide a reiteration of the file, but instead went on to testify as 
to his own actions and personal knowledge of the previous events casting the defendant 
as a liar. The judge stated, "What actually happened was not as Mr. Otterson had 
testified," and concluded his comments with, "You've now been advised with respect to 
the information that is accurate concerning the incident that happened on that hearing." 
Id. at 157-158. 
Because the judge informed the parties that the court was going to "rectify the 
problem" before any "invitation" occurred, and because the judge's testimony went 
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beyond any "invitation" that was made, this Court should find that the practical realities 
of the courtroom dynamics resulted in the judge testifying without invitation. 
IV. THE TOTALITY OF THE ERRORS BY THE TRIAL COURT SERVED TO 
CUMULATIVELY BIAS THE JURY AGAINST THE DEFENDANT 
Finally, the state argues that the court should reject the cumulative error claim for 
three reasons: A) the trial court did not commit manifest injustice when it prevented 
defendant's counsel from addressing an objection to a jury instruction to the jury, B) the 
trial court did not commit plain error when it failed to sua sponte prevent the prosecutor 
from referring to a defendant as a liar, and C) even if the court did commit errors, this 
Court should not reverse under the cumulative error doctrine. See Aplee. Br. at 34, 37, 
and 41. This argument should be rejected because: A) the Trial Court erred by preventing 
the defense counsel from addressing an objection to a jury instruction given to the jury, 
B) The Trial Court erred when it failed to sua sponte prevent the prosecutor from 
referring to defendant as a "liar," and C) the cumulative error doctrine should be applied 
as the totality of the errors by the trial court served to significantly prejudice the jury 
against the defendant. 
A. The trial court erred by preventing the defense counsel from addressing an 
objection to a jury instruction given to the jury 
The state contends that the trial court was not in error when it made corrections to 
defendant's statements regarding one of the Jury Instructions because the defendant 
"objected" to the instructions in front of the jury without first objecting the instructions 
before the judge. See Aplee. Br. at 34, 35, and 36. Defense concedes that it is improper to 
object to any jury instructions to the jury, especially without first making such objections 
known to the judge; yet the defendant did not "object" to the jury instructions at all as 
contended by the state. 
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In an attempt to clarify the definition of "reasonable doubt'* to the jury, the 
defendant stated in closing arguments that "there are very few things in the world that we 
know with absolute certainty" and followed with the example that "I know that I am 
wearing a watch, but they put it in." The judge took exception to these statements and 
stated that "the comments were inappropriate" after the defense had finished with their 
closing arguments. 
Closing arguments are the last impression the jury receives before deliberations 
and therefore are highly influential; any actions influencing that last impression carries 
the risk of being highly prejudicial. The trial court judge made these seemingly 
unnecessary comments at the substantial risk of causing prejudice to the jury. This court 
should find under plain error review that the trial court erred because "an error exists; the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and the error is harmful. .." Pratt v. 
i\fe/5ow,2007UT4lat1f 16. 
B. The trial court erred when it failed to sua sponte prevent the prosecutor 
from referring to defendant as a "liar". 
The Appellee asserts that the state's reference to the defendant as a "liar" was not 
inappropriate because the remark did not "call to the attention of the jury a matter it 
would not be justified in considering in determining the verdict;" {Stale v. Johnson. 2007 
UT App. 184 f^ 42, 163 P.3d 695 (internal quotations, citation, and alterations omitted) or 
in other words, the reference to the defendant as a "liar" was not improper because it was 
true and accurate. 
As mentioned in the appellant's brief, the statement that the defendant is a "liar" 
is inappropriate as the statement either inaccurately characterized the court's previous 
statements or improperly reiterates previous improper statements by the court. See Aplnt. 
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Br. at 24. Utah Courts have decided that it is improper to refer to a defendant as a ''liar.'" 
{State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 184). 
Because it is the jury's responsibility to decide whether an individual lied or not, 
and which testimony from the defendant to believe or to disregard, the state should not 
and is not allowed to refer to a defendant as a "liar." The state's remarks 4,call[ed] to the 
attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in determining the 
verdict." Johnson, 163 P.3d 695. The "proof * that the defendant is a liar as listed by the 
state in their brief, consists of highly contested and disputed evidence which should be 
left to the jury to decide. By labeling the defendant as a "liar" the state undermined 
confidence in the jury's verdict. 
C. The cumulative error doctrine should be applied as the totality of the 
errors by the trial court served to significantly prejudice the jury against 
the defendant. 
Appellee argues that the cumulative error doctrine should not be applied because 
the "trial court did not commit errors in any of the charged issues [and] . . . the evidence 
supporting the defendant's conviction was overwhelming." See Aplee. Br. at 41 and 42. 
Through sound reasoning, the appellant has established that the trial court erred 
by commenting on the defendant's testimony and the defense's closing argument, by 
testifying to and arguing that defendant was a liar, and by failing to limit the state's 
interpretation of the court's comments during their closing. Even if it is found that one of 
these errors does not reach the necessary standard of harm to overturn a trial court 
decision, the cumulative effect of these errors portrays the serious possibility that the 
judge preferred the state's case due to distrust in the defendant's credibility. The 
combination of these errors resulted in a real and substantial disadvantage for the 
defendant and "there is a reasonable likelihood that. . . there would have been a more 
- 1 5 -
favorable result" for the defendant. State ex relAMD., 2006 UT App 457, If 28 n.6, 153 
p.3d 724 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should find that the trial court committed several significant and 
serious errors which resulted in a substantially unjust trial for the defendant. For the 
abovementioned reasons and foregoing analysis, this Court should order a new trial for 
the defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, this ffffi^ day^of fap^U&syC /J008 
MYER 
Appellant/Defendant 
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lesf.r.ur And s^ aoles uij c~erJ tc nia^ c c t.rDnn c 
downstairs tc bnnq up the file caus*- 3 wunteo tc s^ -t, JUP 
vhat ''udge Davr t did I couldr't believe d nudge would 
^ruc^-S^ ano ctif-'v out sonip>r>od} , ac rej. r e s & n t P Q ^ n a secondly 
at iust oudaeniy startle tc sc und fdmiLa'
 A j k hearo 
somethinq about it mt-rigs multiply We \i&dr simild cases 
all the time And once 1 looked at the file, then i '•ouic. 
conduct^ v/ndt counsel nav^ indicated here 
Sc ther<- tner is the responsibility of tbxs Cour* tc 
rectify the problem, tc sec thdt the nury is not letr utr the 
testimony tnat's been given thdt ic incorrect And that's 
where we are 
. MR FACEMYEP I would propose your Honor, for the 
Court — if the Court — one of two things, for the Court to 
reiterate the Court's understanding ol the file tc the -)ur} and 
iust li>e you iust did to us . w<~>ulo be £~nt with that u 
in the alternative, to a_low Mr Eldndge to raise tnose issues 
with my client on the stana and to point out the 
inconsistencies based or the recurd that is supplied lr fh^ 
file 
To be frank with the rourt, I had never nad ar 
intention of raisina issues involving a case — tnat case lonq 
aqo It WdS raised in the \rideo about nis first memory o Dave 
Etargill ana then it was also raised b% uacnryn wnen sh& was or 
the stand ar well /-no sc trie oul / :caS7i 1 went _rto tha' wc~ 
] } 
1 . 
1 
1" 
13 
l o 
in 
18 
1^ 
Z( 
"-|L- •= -no a a ^ ^ t lC 3^ ^ ^j ^ r j p v,-_cr \ O L nepe 
Of- dwdrc of V i t r th«- consent c ' counse ana t h e recoro 
p r e v i o u s l y be ina m a d e , d u r i n g t h e t e s t i m o n y of Mr O t t c s o n , 
theie- wet r e c i t a l LesumorA b t i n co r i ce rmna wha haoD^nea a t 
a h e a n n H b e i o r e J u d c j - Dav s or ar o r a e r t o show cause- Wrier 
Mr StL.rq-1 ano o t h e r s wf-it- u i t s e n t frcrr t n ^ s t a t e wiTiesse1-
t n e i e , xS-u^ b e i n g i a i s e d as t o whether or no r Mr u t t e ^ o r 
cou ld b«- i r the home witr i n s new wife t c be and ch^ lo una-^r 
t ne age of IB And t h a t Judge Davis , a s d r e s u l t oF hea r ing 
t h e ^ n l o r m a t i o n , c h d S t . s e a uh<= peop le i o . b r i n g ^ n o the cas^ 
forwaro and r u l e d i n Mr O t t e r s o r ' s favor and l e t t n e mar r iage 
and the Oaughte" l i v e t h e r e 
Wnen 1 h e a r d t h a t t e s t i m o n y , my mind began t o come 
out of n e u t r a l , a n d so I asked the c l e r ) t o p l e a s e b r i n g up t h e 
fax<- because s o m e t h i n g about t h a t t e s t i m o n y WdS f a m i l i a r "o me, 
as I a d v i s e e Doth l a w v e r s Wher I got t h e f x l e , . d i s *<-iea 
tha1" wha- hao a c t u a l l y happen<=c was not a s Mi O t t e r s o r nad 
t e s t i f i e d Th° i s s u e war r a i s e d w i t r a d u l t p r o b a t i o r and 
parol*3 ^s a r e s u l t cf t h e q u e s t i o n b e n e r a i s e d as t o wnethei 
or not M. O - e r s o n couiu nic r .no have t i r - c h i l d under t n e 
aq<- 31 a a u l p j o b d t i o r and p a i o . e r i -^ -J a r e q u e s t u t r the 
*~OL~CI D ~t i~ Coui *c have r n a ^ n g 
h i t a t i n a v\as nexd Ke^omrrendati ns w r e made — 
^••cuse me Let me bac 1 ur, - s o r e s u l r of t n a t r eques t frorr 
adul*" R_oD^txor a n a pa-c_>=, a h e a i _ n c was s c h e d u l e d and t ha t 
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hearing war scheduled or trie JUth of Auqust ^OOJ Mr Cttr^-^ 
was present Counsel for Mr Otterson was present, tnat was 
Mr Soencei at the txine Mi Otterson Wds present arid I was 
tne -judqe, not Juag- Da is 
Lc
 a result o* thaL i! ^ tiai meeting, a subseouert 
evidentiary hearina was schedulec for Auqust th«= <_2 , two 
days later At that h<=-anna tnt minute entrv and the uider was 
prepared and filed at the Court s request, witnesses writ 
called, both lawyers argued <_ne case Mr Sturgill was not even 
involved Mr Taylor from thc county attornev's oif_c~ 
represented the State of Utah and the prosecution, not Mr 
Sturgill 
I heard the Witnesses and received tne 
recommendations Nobody was chastised by any ludqe Ana a^ a 
result of that hearing, I found that '•he o.iginaj condit_or 
imposec bv juage DoVxS at the time or senter~_nc _r - ^s case 
xn 2001 June £5th, would not be changed, and tnat the 
restriction with respect tc the minor undei th<=- age of IP would 
r emalr 
The»-t- was nc*- c cnnditior _moosea wnj eope~r t Mr 
Otterson's opoortunitv tc marry out tha+" the conaitxOr of the 
cn__o .lvinc ±r the hDrr<=- VJOUIO s^and YOL I/& no» beer ad is^c 
w.tt respect to tne -ntormatior that is accurate- conceTtinc the 
.n^ aer' that raDpen°c or r>a n&ar_na 
JJ cros„- = / air_r J- or 
^T_F. 30UPt TF-KCC 
Mi- ELDrlDGL foe. dun' i interic tu o<ai_ i.im, no 
2 THE COURT: Okay You may oe excused, Officer. 
3 A VOICE- ThanJ you 
4 MP FACEMYER- Than J you. 
I THE COURT Go aheud 
6 MR FACEMYER Officer Browei is going to be the last 
7 prosecution witness. I was told yesterday that the exwife of 
8 Mr. Otterson was q o m g to be here as a prosecution witness as 
9 well, and maybe I was going to have her as a wa tries? as well. 
10 So I don't know if they were planning on that. 1 know that 
1_ she's planning on being here around 11. 
12 MR. ELDRIDGE: Yeah. She came and talked to us 
13 yesterday at 11 We told her to be here about 11:00. We 
14 wouldn't call her as a witness in the case case in cnief, but 
15 possibly as a rebuttal witness 
16 MR. FACEMYER: So I guess I would probaoly put her on 
17 the stand then as well because I have some information I'd lake 
18 to glean from her. 
19 But my primary witness ir today's issue is Richard 
20 Cummmgs. He's an inmate at the Gunnison prison, he has also 
21 been an inmate at the Utah County Jail with Mr. Otterson and 
22 J Mr. Hill and Mr Watson and that pod area. 
23 The testimony, in speal m g with Mr Cummmgs, I would 
2L like to present to the ^ury, is further that Mr. Cummmgs knows 
25 Mr. Hill, they were m the same poa area Secona, Mi Hill 
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1 that would probably answer some of the questions on some of his 
2 benavior in the courtroom that I think was a very apDarent to 
3 me I know at was apparent to my partner as well, and I would 
A lile Mr Cummmgs to be able to testify to that 
5 Tmrdly, or fourtnly, that Mr. Hill had spoken 
6 readily about snitching on other people with Mr. Cummings and 
7 that that was his modus ODerandi in the jail, was to snitch on 
8 many people, and that was standard. 
9 Mr Hill testified tnat he had never snitched on 
10 people except to protect them, and I didn't think that was 
11 honest. And I have a rebuttal witness that would say that 
12 that's not tne case. 
13 THE COURT- Mr. Eldndqe'3 
14 MR. ELDRIDGE: Your Honor, excuse me, in looking at 
15 the rules of evidence, I aon't think that the testimony that 
16 Mr Facemyer's profferec to the Court is admissible for several 
17 reasons 
18 I think first you started with Rule 401 which talks 
19 about what's relevant, and Rule 401 says, "relevant evidence 
2C means evidence havi-.g any tendency to make the existence of any 
21 fact that is of consequence to the termination of a action more 
22 probable or less probable than it woulc be without trie 
23 evidence " I don't think that what Mr Facemyer has proffered 
2^ to the court meets that level I aon't thmt that any of tnat 
25 information manes any fact that's of consequence in tne trial 
dfcn_ed not tdj.iiit itit, inedicdtioi on the stdiid I Uuiil i 
was a lor of issues made aDout hit demeanor aboui hov he 
handleo that with his medication and things lake that 
Mi. Cumnung.s would be able testify that he stoc 
the line everv day with Mr Hill at the Utah County Jail 
pills. There is a group of guys that gc ana get tnose p;> 
and that many times Mi Hill would cheel those uilis and 
swallow them, and then take them out of the aieo ana tnei 
them to others m the area 
Mr Hill denied doing that, both not taKing th 
cheeking them ana then also selling them. And tnird, Mr 
Cummings would be able to testify that Mr. Hill — 
MR. ELDRIDGE Study the — 
MR. FACEMYER Correct. I gave it ail to 
Mr Eldridcfe. I'm trying to recall my information. 
Tnat Mr. Hill was proficient in the jau. at 
discussing how to testify in trxal, ana that Mi Cumminc 
seen Mr. H L I I and other inmates review the competency s« 
in the sta:ute, and they would piactice on one anotner I 
handle Lnemselves m a competency hearing and otner hea 
a court setting so that they could give their aemeanor 
wanted it to oe rather than being who they real Jy are. 
And I think oecause of Mr. Hill's demeanor in 
courtroom, ne would gc frorr very lethargic, and then m 
conversation wouia ]ust go fine and fine, and I think t 
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